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On the Categories and Principles of Soviet Military Strategy

by

Major General N. N. KUZNETSOV,
Candidate of Military Sciences, Docent

Military strategy, as a component and the highest field of the art of warfare, includes the theory and practice of preparing a country and its armed forces for war and the planning and conduct of strategic operations and of a war as a whole. The logical structure of the theory of military strategy includes specific concepts and principles. Of these, the most general concepts that reflect the essential properties, aspects, and relationships of armed combat on the strategic scale and the preparation of a country and its armed forces for war are conventionally called categories.

The categories of military strategy are formed in the process of studying and generalizing the experience from previous wars, from the practice of military organizational development in peacetime, and from theoretical research on the nature and methods of preparing for and waging present-day operations. They reflect the continuously developing dynamic features and processes of armed combat. Scientific and technical progress overall, and especially in military matters, promotes the constant development and enrichment of all the categories of military strategy and the emergence of new ones.

In describing economic categories, Karl MARX wrote in his study The Poverty of Philosophy: "Economic categories are merely theoretical expressions and abstractions from the social relationships of production... and these categories are no more everlasting than the relationships they express. They represent historical and transitory products" (K. Marks i F. Engel's. Soch. [K. MARX and F. ENGELS. Works], vol. 4, p. 133). The categories of military strategy are likewise historical to the same extent. They are truths only so long as they objectively reflect the nature of wars of a given epoch, and the processes of armed combat and the forms and methods of preparing for and waging it that correspond to the weapons employed, the prospects for their development, the

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level of combat readiness, and the combat capabilities of the armed forces.

In connection with the scientific and technical revolution in military affairs, the creation of nuclear weapons, the accumulation of knowledge of war and military operations on the strategic scale, and changes in the organizational structure of the armed forces, such previously well-known categories as war, the strategic operation, the air operation, strategic deployment of the armed forces, etc., have been filled with different content. New categories have appeared: nuclear world war, strategic nuclear forces, strategic missile troops, general nuclear war (foreign), limited nuclear war (foreign), and others. At the same time, categories that no longer reflect the objective processes, aspects, and features of present-day wars have lost their serviceable role in strategy and have passed into the conceptual system of military history. Among these are the general engagement, cordon strategy, the campaign, the strategy of annihilation, the major battle [bitva], the covering army, and others.

Therefore, the forming of categories of military strategy is a lengthy process of generalizing military practice and military-scientific research. Categories have been built up and improved gradually in the form of an interrelated and structured system that has become a highly important element of the logical structure of the theory of strategy.

The system of categories of military strategy has the following principal inherent features. First, close interconnections among them. Taken together, i.e., by groups corresponding to the topics and divisions of strategy and in a definite sequence, they make it possible to obtain with all objectivity and validity a very complete picture of a war as a whole, of military operations on the strategic scale, and of the principles of preparing for and waging a war.

Second, a strict subordination or hierarchy of categories. In military strategy, as in the art of warfare as a whole, there are higher-level categories: war, armed forces, and armed combat. There are also those that occupy an intermediate position and those that belong to a lower level. These reflect only a part, a feature, or an element of higher-level categories.

Third, the possibility of uniting homogeneous categories in groups. This is because lower-level categories are in various degrees detailed elaborations of more general categories placed above them. Such groups may comprise, for example, strategic operations of armed forces, strategic leadership, strategic

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deployment, strategic planning, branches of armed forces, combat readiness of armed forces, a theater of military operations, etc. For example, in the group "strategic operations of armed forces" categories may be arranged by degree of importance in the following sequence: strategic offensive and strategic defensive, forms of strategic actions or operations and their constituent parts, etc. The group "theater of military operations" may consist of continental theater of military operations, strategic axis, operational axis, and strategic area.

Fourth, the presence within the logical structure of the theory of military strategy of other categories as well. Examples of this are philosophical categories (space, time, etc.), general scientific categories (economic potential, moral potential, etc.), and the categories of operational art and tactics (the front operation, the army operation, the battle, etc.).

Along with the categories, military strategy also has its own terms (words or phrases designating specific concepts) employed to designate its specific subjects, elements, features, and processes, in addition to its categories 50X1-HUM

For example, large-scale military operations conducted on a large territory, and also conducted in coastal waters and adjacent air space in order to accomplish strategic missions, are designated by the term "strategic operation in a continental theater of military operations." However, when the subject concerns the concept of "strategic operation in a continental theater of military operations" as a category of military strategy, in the consciousness of a military specialist there arises a present-day scientific idea that it is being waged by a major grouping of armed forces in a theater of military operations and that it represents a combination of attacks, operations, and combat actions that are coordinated and interrelated by goal, place, and time for the troops (or forces) making up the grouping of armed forces in the theater of military operations and that are conducted according to a unified concept and plan in order to achieve strategic goals. Strategic missions and the requisite forces, means, and methods to accomplish them are determined in accordance with this. Simultaneously, in our consciousness we conceive the main parameters and measures for preparing this operation, the possible alternatives for starting and conducting it, and the expected results.

Consequently, a category consists of a definition and basic assumptions that reveal its main content, but a term is just a name or verbal designation of a subject (feature or process) that may change. For example, up to the mid-1950s

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the term "operation of several fronts" was employed, and later on it became "operation of a group of fronts." However, the use of either of these terms did not alter the content of the category of the strategic offensive operation of that time.

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The theory of Soviet military strategy includes several dozen basic categories: war, armed forces, armed combat, branch of armed forces, nature of war, strategic offensive, form of strategic actions, strategic operation, strategic goal, strategic mission, theater of military operations, strategic deployment, etc. Naturally, it is impossible to deal with each of these in a single article. Let us take as an illustration, for example, a brief description of strategic goal and strategic mission.

A strategic goal is the envisioned result of military actions in a war or strategic operation, the attainment of which will bring about a radical change in the military-political and strategic situation and advance the further successful conduct of the war and its victorious conclusion. General and specific strategic goals are distinguished. Specific ones are: defeating a grouping of enemy armed forces in a theater of military operations or in a specified area of it; undermining the military-economic potential of one or several enemy countries; disrupting the enemy's system of government and military command and control; knocking out of the war one or several countries of an enemy coalition; etc.

The specific content of strategic goals depends on the political goals of the country at war and its economic and political-moral capabilities, the makeup and combat might of the armed forces of the sides, the weapons employed, the military-political situation, and the physical geographic conditions. The grouping of armed forces in a theater of military operations and the strategic axes are established and the strategic missions of the forces are defined in conformity with the strategic goals.

Strategic missions detail and divide, as it were, a specific strategic goal by stages of attaining it and by targets for the application of efforts by troop groupings, and they provide it with spatial and temporal boundaries. Taken together, they express the content of this goal in a more specific form, and each of the missions is a component element of it. Where a strategic goal determines the final results of military operations in one theater or another, strategic missions indicate what must be done to achieve the established goal.

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The specific content of missions depends on several factors, the chief of them being: the military-political situation, the nature of the strategic goal, the makeup and capabilities of the troop (or force) groupings of the sides, the means and methods of armed combat employed, and the particular features of the theater or area of military operations.

The great importance of categories consists of their conceptual function, since they are one of the forms of concentrating and systematizing knowledge, and because of this they are stages for further knowledge of war. Moreover, an in-depth understanding of them aids and facilitates the solution of many specific problems in the theory and practice of strategy. It is wholly obvious that it would be impossible to accomplish specific tasks of planning a strategic operation in a theater of military operations without a conception of its essence and content, of the strategic goals and missions, of the theater of military operations, etc. In this connection it is appropriate to recall the following guidance from V. I. LENIN: "...he who undertakes specific problems without first solving general ones will inevitably and unwittingly "stumble" over these general problems at every step" (Poln. sobr. soch. [Complete Collected Works], vol. 15, p. 368).

Being the foundation of the professional language of military specialists, categories support their free intercommunications, the oral and written transmission of orders, directives, and instructions as well as unity in grasping them, and also the dissemination of military knowledge. An in-depth understanding of categories is an essential requisite for logical thinking and for success in scientific research work.

The importance of the categories of strategy becomes greater the more precisely and logically they reflect the features and processes of armed combat. Having an objective foundation, these categories serve as the result of in-depth and comprehensive knowledge of war. It is impermissible to include within the purview of categories subjective and arbitrary matter that does not conform to reality. That can lead only to negative consequences. "Categories must be derived (and not just taken arbitrarily and mechanically), (not by "telling stories" and not by "assuring," but by demonstrating"... (V. I. LENIN. Complete Collected Works, vol. 29, p. 86).

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Other elements of the logical structure of the theory of Soviet military strategy are principles,* which are general and scientifically grounded regulations, rules, and recommendations for the practical activities of the state and higher military leadership regarding the preparation of the armed forces and the country for war, the organization and conduct of strategic operations, and the command and control of troops and forces in peacetime and in wartime. The formulation and constant development of principles are based on the generalization of many centuries of experience in preparing for and waging wars, the analysis of the development of the material base of the armed forces of the sides, and the deeper penetration into the operational mechanism of the general laws of war and the laws of armed combat.** The principles of strategy are the principles of the art of warfare, but their content is brought into complete accord with the scales of military operations and the missions of the leadership on the highest strategic level. They reflect the laws of warfare and armed combat and derive from them, and like the categories they have an objective foundation.

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The resemblance of the principles of strategy to the principles of operational art and tactics is only external and formal. In fact they differ substantially both in the scales of the ties and relationships that they reflect and in their impact on the course and outcome of military operations. For example, whereas the principle of concentrating forces at the decisive place and moment is implemented in operational art on a relatively narrow sector of front, in reference to a war as a whole the application of this principle implies the concentration of the efforts of the armed forces on the strategic axes and in the theaters of military operations that are most important. Accordingly, in the first instance the operational-level command applies this principle, and in the second -- the strategic-level command. The principles of operational art and tactics differ from the principles of strategy in that the first reflect only the laws of armed combat, while the second also reflect the general laws of war, i.e., the laws of its course and outcome. In the light of these particular

* See Voyennaya Mysl' [Military Thought], No. 10, 1979, pp. 17-21.

**Other opinions have also been expressed on this point in the military literature. The internal, substantive, stable, and necessary ties and relationships between the events of armed combat that determine its nature, course, and outcome have been regarded not as laws but as characteristic patterns that serve as an intermediate link between the laws of war and the principles of the art of warfare.

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features one may quite properly speak of the relative independence of the principles of military strategy.

Historical experience has shown that in-depth knowledge and the skillful and creative incorporation into practice of strategic principles with consideration of the specific conditions of the military-political and operational-strategic situation are highly important factors for successfully attaining the goals of strategic operations and of a war as a whole. Obviously, neither principles nor laws by themselves can wage or win wars, operations, and battles. Only people can do this. By relying on objective laws reflected in principles, people in effect coordinate their subjective activities with the natural trends of the course of military operations in a specific situation and they influence the situation, in order to achieve victory. The effect of objective laws is therefore not automatic. It is a result of the deliberate activities of organs of command and control and troops (or forces). People can limit the effects of some laws and the principles deriving from them and give scope to others. It is this that constitutes the very essence of the leadership skill of military cadres and the combat skills of all personnel.

It is known that the course and outcome of a war depend on the relative strengths of the military forces of the opposing sides. But this does not mean that the side with the greater military strength will automatically achieve success. On the contrary, there are many examples in history where equal or even fewer forces have achieved victory. During the Civil War, for example, the young Soviet republic was, in the words of V. I. LENIN, economically and militarily incomparably weaker than the forces of domestic counterrevolution and foreign intervention, but the Red Army defeated the more numerous enemy forces. Similar examples can be found in wars of national liberation. These are evidence that the results of armed combat depend primarily on the skillful and creative application of the principles of the art of warfare, i.e., on the skill of military leaders and the readiness of troops (or forces) and on their ability to effectively carry out combat missions. Account must be taken of the fact that in a war a multitude of laws and principles are operating in a close interrelationship and with reciprocal effect, therefore their impact under certain conditions may be greater or lesser as compared to other conditions, depending on the scientific level of the leadership of troops and naval forces.

The great versatility of strategic principles should be noted. In connection with changes in the methods of producing material goods and in the political goals of war, with improvement in the means of armed combat, with the

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emergence of new historical conditions for preparing and waging war, and with the effect of other factors these principles are continuously developing. Some of them retain their importance for a long time, while their content is expanded and enriched; others lose their role because they do not conform to the nature of wars at various epochs of social development; and still others are rebuilt from the bottom up to reflect the specifics of some law of armed combat under new historical conditions. In his critique of PROUDHON, who tried to prove the permanence of economic categories, Karl MARX wrote: "The very people who are establishing social relationships in conformity with the development of the material production of those relationships are also creating the principles, ideas, and categories that accord with their own social relationships" (K. MARX and F. ENGELS, Works, vol. 4, p. 133). This conclusion is wholly applicable to the development of the principles of military strategy.

The evolution of their content can easily be followed by the example of the development of the principle of concentrating forces in the decisive place and at the decisive moment, which was discovered even before our era. Being a reflection of the objective law of the dependence of success in armed combat on the comparative combat strength and capabilities of the warring sides, it ensures, when skillfully employed, the most effective actions of troops, forces, and means by creating a superiority over the enemy on the main axes at the decisive periods and moments of a war and of operations. The history of wars has confirmed the validity of the well known principle of EPAMINONDAS. Thousands of battles, engagements, and operations have been won thanks to its skillful application. The Red Army command under the overall leadership of V. I. LENIN provided classic examples of the skillful use of the principle of concentrating more numerous forces on the axis of the main attack under the highly difficult conditions of the Civil War. He called the creation of an overwhelming preponderance of forces at the decisive moment and at the decisive point the "law" of military success (See: Complete Collected Works, vol. 40, p. 6). This principle was also extensively and effectively applied by the Supreme High Command during the Great Patriotic War.

Under present-day conditions the content of the principle of concentrating forces at the decisive place and moment has become more capacious and its application more complicated. For example, in a nuclear war it assumes a new quality, since the main idea of it is not to continuously build up troops and naval forces in regions of limited area or in relatively narrow zones, but to mass the strikes of nuclear and conventional weapons against the main groupings of enemy armed forces and to concentrate manpower and materiel briefly at the

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decisive moment and then rapidly disperse them. When conducting combat operations while employing just conventional weapons of destruction that fire (or are launched) at long range, one can rapidly prepare and deliver fire strikes against major enemy groupings to the entire depth of his formation and decisively affect the course of operations.

But there are such principles of strategy that are formulated on the basis of scientific research and that result from the discovery and knowledge of the objective laws of war and armed combat and from abstract thinking. For example, present-day views of the nature and methods of waging a nuclear war are not so much the product of generalizing experience from the world wars (although this factor too cannot be ignored) as they are of an in-depth analysis and forecast of the probable war that would be waged with the use of fundamentally new means of combat.

The formulation of the principles of Soviet military strategy proceeds on the basis of the general laws of war and the laws of armed combat. The former refer to: the law of the decisive role of the political goals of a war, the laws of the dependence of the course and outcome of a war on the relative strengths of the economic, social, moral-political, and especially the military forces of the warring sides, and other laws.

The laws of armed combat refer to: the dependence of its course and outcome on the relative strength in the combat might of the troops (or forces) of the opposing sides; the law of the non-uniformity of the distribution of troops (or forces) by front and depth; the dependence of the forms and methods of military operations on weapons, combat equipment, and personnel; the correspondence and interdependence of the forms and methods of the military operations conducted at various levels (the tactical with the operational, the operational with the strategic, and the strategic with the overall course of the war), and other laws.

The employment of the general laws of war and the laws of armed combat shows up in the final analysis in the strategic principles and in the skillful application of certain of them while taking account of others in order to achieve victory.

Thus, the law of the decisive role of the political goals of a war has been theoretically formulated on the foundation of the knowledge of a war's sociopolitical essence and the large number of its substantive links with

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politics. This knowledge has led to the highly important conclusions that war is a part of politics, it is mass instruction in politics, and it is a summation and means of politics, and that the nature of political goals decisively affects the conduct of a war. The discovery of the mechanism of the effect of this law has shown that its influence encompasses all aspects of a war, since the extent of the employment of violent means by a country, the scale (scope and duration) and bitterness of armed combat, and the nature of a country's life depend on political goals. Politics determines the main and other enemies, the forces and means employed in military operations, the time and procedures for committing them to battle, and the intensity and duration of strategic operations, while taking into account their end results and the tasks of postwar organization.

Along with this, war exerts a retroactive effect on politics by helping to achieve the goals it is pursuing and by expanding or limiting its capabilities. "War is a part of a whole, and that whole is politics" (Leninskiy sbornik [Leninist Digest], XII, p. 433). The link between war and politics is inseparable, stable, and lasting. This is an objective law, from which the fundamental principle of strategy is derived that strategic goals and missions must conform to the political goals of a war. The soundness of this is confirmed by many centuries of historical experience. It retains its importance under present-day conditions and is the guiding factor when planning the strategic employment of armed forces and when waging a war.

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When disclosing the dependence of military might on economic forces and capabilities, Friedrich ENGELS wrote: "There is nothing so dependent on economic conditions as an army and a navy. Weapons, manpower, organization, tactics, and strategy depend primarily on the level of production achieved at a given moment and on the means of communication." He stressed that the primary thing in brute force is "economic might and the availability of powerful means of heavy industry" (K. MARX and F. ENGELS, Works, vol. 20, pp. 171 and 178). This is also the law of the dependence of a country's military might on its economic forces and capabilities, on the basis of which strategic theory has drawn many practical conclusions and recommendations, which have then become the principles of preparing for and conducting strategic operations.

The sense of these is as follows. When solving problems of military organizational development, a country's highest military leaders must take into account the development level of the country's economy, the amount and quality of industrial output, the ability to convert the economy from a peacetime to a wartime footing, and the degree of professional training of workers and of

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engineering and technical personnel. Furthermore, these leaders must have the appropriate influence on the economy and make recommendations for its timely preparation for war, for increasing the output of the types of products most important for strengthening the country's defense and improving output quality, and for the rational relocation of economic facilities in order to increase their survivability, the ease of protecting them against enemy attacks, and their use during wartime.

The most important strategic principles that reflect the operation of this law are the timely creation of stockpiles of supplies and weapons, maintaining them at the proper level and using them skillfully throughout the entire war, and all-around material and technical support of strategic operations.

The effect of the law of the dependence of the course and outcome of a war on the relative strengths of the economic forces and capabilities of the warring sides shows up primarily in the principle of the congruence between the political and strategic goals of a war and a country's economic capabilities. More than a century ago Friedrich ENGELS wrote on this point: "...force is only a means, but its goal, on the other hand, is economic advantage" (K. MARX and F. ENGELS, Works, vol. 20, p. 164). This shows up further in the continuing quantitative and qualitative changes in means of armed combat, in the growth or decrease in the combat capabilities of armed forces during a war, and in the improvement of old and the emergence of new forms and methods of strategic operations, and changes in their end results.

The interrelationship between war and the economy is stable, lasting, and valid for all epochs. "...The entire organization of armies and the methods they employ for waging battle, and consequently for victory or defeat, turn out to be dependent on material, i.e., economic conditions..." (K. MARX and F. ENGELS, Works, vol. 20, p. 175). This interrelationship is strengthened and becomes more complex in step with the development of the means of production.

The principle of the congruence between the political and strategic goals of a war and a country's economic capabilities was very skillfully applied by the Soviet Union's military-political leaders during the Great Patriotic War. Under the most difficult conditions they were able to create the material conditions for a radical turnaround in the course of the war.

A quite different situation developed in fascist Germany, which at the outset of the war surpassed the USSR 5:1 in coal output, 3:1 in steel

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production, and 2.3:1 in electric power generation. And in its armed forces there were three times more aircraft and tanks than in the Red Army. However, Germany's fascist leadership lacked the means and the ability to maintain superiority in its economy, and in the forces and means of armed combat. Already by the end of 1942 the relative strengths in aircraft, tanks, and guns had shifted to the advantage of our armed forces. Their increasing superiority over the fascist German troops in the principal types of weapons and combat equipment in the final years of the war, when combined with several other factors, foreordained Germany's defeat. The complete superiority and the higher capabilities of the socialist economic system over the capitalist system showed their effect. Victory was also due to the indisputable advantages of our social and governmental structure, the unity of Soviet society, the patriotism and friendship of the peoples of the USSR, and their heroism, courage, and solidarity around the CPSU and its wise leadership, and also to the superiority of the Soviet art of warfare and strategy in particular.

The law of the dependence of a country's military might on its moral-political forces and capabilities and the law formulated by V. I. LENIN about the dependence of victory in war on the mental state of the masses who shed their blood on the battlefield are reflected in the principle of all-around consideration for and full utilization of moral-political and psychological factors, the implementation of which is expressed in the entire system of the practical measures of the command and the political organs at all echelons that support the ideological conditioning of military personnel and the forming in them of a Marxist-Leninist world outlook and high moral-political, psychological, and combat qualities. In-depth understanding and full consideration of the moral-political and psychological state of friendly troops (or forces), of the country's population, and of the enemy are an important indicator of the practicability of strategic plans and a condition for attaining strategic goals.

A knowledge of the law of the dependence of the methods and forms of military operations on the quantity and quality of weapons and on the state of the people employing those weapons in war makes it possible to understand in greater depth the reasons for revolutionary and abrupt changes in military affairs and to discover trends in the further steady development of the methods and forms of strategic operations. A reflection of this law is the creativity of military commanders in their selection of methods to defeat the enemy depending on the manpower and materiel at their disposal and on the other conditions of the military-political and strategic situation. A reflection of

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the overall dependence and interdependence of the topics and features of armed combat and the law of the unity of troop military operations according to time and space to achieve military-political goals is the principle of the unification of the efforts of all branches of the armed forces by their close coordination.

Consequently, the principles of military strategy are only recommendations, requirements, or guiding ideas. Their multifaceted impact on the course and outcome of armed combat shows up in actuality through the mechanism of the impact of the objective laws that they reflect. Therefore the diversity of the impact of any principle in a specific situation can be considered only under conditions of in-depth knowledge of the general law of war or the law of armed combat reflected by it.

In affecting the course and outcome of combat these objective laws are not all isolated from one another. Therefore in a single strategic principle there can be found the reflection of one or several laws. For example, the laws of the dependence of the course and outcome of strategic operations on the overall quality and quantity of weapons, combat equipment, and troops (or forces) and on the moral-political and psychological state of personnel are embodied in the principle of constant and high combat and mobilization readiness of the armed forces.

The system of the categories and principles of strategy cannot be further developed without all-around and continuous improvement in its theory and practice. Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. USTINOV, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Minister of Defense has stated: "The complexity of the processes going on both in overall social development and in military affairs requires that Soviet military science delve even more deeply into the nature and particular features of present-day war, clarify the mechanism for the manifestation of its laws, and continuously and comprehensively interpret the patterns and trends in the development of weapons and the methods of conducting military operations. The importance is increasing for the timely development of scientifically validated ways of solving strategic, operational, and tactical problems..."*

* USTINOV, D. F. Sluzhim Rodine, delu kommunizma [We Serve the Homeland and the Cause of Communism], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1982, p. 74.

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Under present-day conditions, when the relative strength of forces in the world arena has substantially shifted in favor of socialism, when the struggle between two of the world's social systems has become unprecedentedly acute, and when scientific and technical progress and the increasing capabilities of the economy are creating the prerequisites for the production and mass introduction of new and improved types of weapons into the armed forces, the theory of strategy has been presented with a real need to investigate the nature of wars in the current epoch in greater depth and to bring to light the objective laws of armed combat and the mechanism by which they are manifested in various strategic situations. A scientifically valid forecast of the nature of wars creates decisive prerequisites for properly defining all the practical tasks of preparing the country and the armed forces to repel imperialist aggression. This is closely linked with forecasting the patterns of development of the military-political situation on global and regional scales and the main trends in the development of the economy, science, technology, and means of armed combat. Military-political forecasting is therefore now one of the most important tasks of strategy.

A feature of the present-day worldwide military-political situation is the existence in peacetime of coalitions of countries that have coalition (combined) armed forces. The aggressive NATO bloc is opposed by the defensive military-political alliance of the Warsaw Pact countries. In order to reliably defend the achievements of world socialism there must be an in-depth elaboration of the problems of a coalition war in the light of changes in the military-political situation, the strength of the countries making up the coalition, and their economic, moral-political, and military capabilities.

To improve the combat readiness of the combined armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries it is very important to further develop a socialist military science that is common to all the fraternal armies. This is a matter of bringing the main tenets of military theory closer together, developing common views on the nature and methods of combat operations, finding more effective forms and methods of employing forces and means and commanding and controlling them, and implementing coordinated measures to increase the combat readiness of the allied armies and navies to decisively defeat any aggressor.

Even in peacetime the reactionary forces of imperialism have major groupings of armed forces in various theaters of military operations that are at high combat readiness and equipped with all types of up-to-date weapons. They are capable of initiating and conducting large-scale military operations with the

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most decisive goals. They can be put into immediate readiness for war very rapidly and secretly. Moreover, US military strategy -- a strategy of direct confrontation between the US and the USSR -- openly proclaims the permissibility of waging a nuclear war and calculates on winning it. It therefore places its main reliance on a first, surprise, and preemptive ("disarming") nuclear attack.

The increased danger of a surprise aggressor attack makes it essential to find ways and methods of further increasing the combat readiness of the armed forces and ensuring their timely commitment to battle and the disruption of the enemy's intentions no matter what methods are used to unleash a war. High combat readiness is likewise unthinkable without well organized mobilization readiness. Marshal of the Soviet Union N. V. OGARKOV, chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces and USSR First Deputy Minister of Defense, has stressed that: "...Constant readiness for the immediate mobilization deployment of troops and naval forces and the timely shift of the armed forces and the entire national economy from a peacetime to a wartime footing is becoming a task of special state importance.

"...The close interconnection of the mobilization readiness of the armed forces, the national economy, and Civil Defense are highly important conditions for maintaining the country's overall defense capability at the requisite level."*

In step with changes in the material foundation for waging war and especially with the development of wholly new means of combat, inevitably new forms and methods of strategic operations emerge and the existing ones are improved. Developing these forms and methods on time and applying them in the practical training of the armed forces is a highly important task for strategy. Its accomplishment, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. USTINOV has pointed out, is no less important than the development and production of new weapons and combat equipment.**

Changes in the nature of war overall, and especially in the forces and means of waging it and in the forms and methods of strategic operations, directly influence the planning for repulsing a surprise attack. Developing and improving this planning is now a scientific and practical task of priority

* OGARKOV, N. V. Vsegda v gotovnosti k zashchite Otechestva [Always Ready to Defend the Homeland], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1982, pp. 59, 60.

**USTINOV, D. F. Op. cit., p. 75.

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importance. Plans to defeat an aggressor must be evaluated from the standpoint of the effectiveness of the combat operations of troops (or forces) by means of mathematical modelling, and the determination of the operational-strategic foundations for this has become one of the urgent problems of strategy.

The diversity of means for waging a war and the complexity, dynamism, and expanded scope of strategic operations have increasingly complicated cooperation among the heterogeneous groupings of troops and forces taking part in them. The task consists of taking these factors into account in order to improve the classification of types of cooperation, to specify the volume of measures for cooperation to be carried out by the various levels of command and control, the procedures and methods of its organization in a variety of situations, and other problems.

The continuous increase in the destructive power of not only nuclear weapons, but of conventional weapons as well, has imparted an unprecedented lethal nature to present-day military operations of any scale. The failure to develop defensive measures or to develop them in sufficient depth can lead to massive casualties. In step with the emergence of ever newer means and methods of combat there has been a continuous increase in the volume and complexity of defensive measures. Because of this, the search for effective methods of increasing the survivability of groupings of armed forces has taken on particular importance for strategy and for military science as a whole.

Also in need of further intensive research are the problems of regrouping various types of troops (or forces) and ensuring autonomy of operation by their groupings. Also still urgent is the task of the theoretical generalization of the experience of the Great Patriotic War and of its use under present-day conditions. Strategy constantly keeps in its field of view research on the operational-strategic foundations for the comprehensive support of strategic operations and the development of the means of waging war, and the elaboration of recommendations on preparing the economy, the populace, and the country's territory to repel aggression, and on other matters.

Among the urgent tasks in the theory of strategy is resolving the problems of ensuring reliable leadership of the armed forces under various conditions of the unleashing of a war by an aggressor and of conducting military operations.

The high morale of the defenders of the homeland is of enormous importance in the task of defeating the enemy. Army General A. A. YEPISHEV, chief of the

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Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, has noted that: "Successful leadership of troops assumes that account will be taken of all components of the moral factor, which includes both sociopolitical and sociopsychological elements... In the work of improving the morale of personnel it is therefore important to systematically monitor both the ideological preparation of servicemen and the mood of the collective, and this will help to maintain the combat spirit of the troops at a high level and ensure the accomplishment of any combat missions.*

In conclusion it should be emphasized that Soviet military science is becoming ever more prominent as one of the main factors for improving the armed forces and increasing their combat might and combat readiness. Under conditions of a sharply increasing military threat it is called on to steadily seek ways of further increasing the combat readiness of the Army and Navy to repel an attack by any aggressor and defeat him. Solving this problem primarily requires in-depth delving into the essence of the laws of war and armed combat and skillfully applying them to ensure the reliable defense of the peaceful and creative labor of the Soviet people.

Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. USTINOV remarked at a united political day of the central apparatus of the Ministry of Defense: "The Soviet people can be confident that no enemy intrigues will take us unawares. Our armed forces are capable of decisively repelling any aggression, no matter where it comes from. The peaceful labor of the Soviet people is being protected, and protected reliably.**

* YEPISHEV, A. A. Ideyam partii verny [Loyal to Party Ideas], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1981, p. 32.
** Krasnaya zvezda [Red Star], 12 November 1983.

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